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Abstract: We perform a comprehensive analysis of the stepping-stone effect of temporary 
agency employment on unemployed workers. Using the timing-of-events approach, we not 
only investigate whether agency employment is a bridge into regular employment but also 
analyze its effect on post-unemployment wages and job stability for unemployed Danish 
workers. We find evidence of large positive treatment effects, particularly for immigrants. 
There is also some indication that higher treatment intensity increases the likelihood of leav-
ing unemployment for regular jobs. Our results show that agency employment is even more 
effective in tight labor markets, where firms use agency employment primarily to screen po-
tential candidates for permanent posts. Finally, our results suggest that agency employment 
may improve subsequent match quality in terms of wages and job duration. 
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JEL-Code: C41, J64, J30, J40 1. Introduction 
In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis of the stepping-stone effects of temporary 
agency employment on unemployed workers in Denmark in the period 1997-2006. Using 
duration models and the “timing-of-events” approach, we investigate whether agency 
employment generally acts as a bridge to regular employment, and also look for heterogeneous 
effects of temporary agency jobs. Moreover, we investigate how the treatment intensity affect 
our results, and how temporary agency employment affects post-unemployment job quality.  
The question whether temporary agency employment is a springboard into regular em-
ployment has become increasingly important since temporary agency employment has in-
creased in most European countries during the past decade: in 2007, temporary agencies em-
ployed about 2 percent of the EU working population (CIETT 2009). Until recently, however, 
Denmark has been the exception, with an almost nonexistent temporary help sector. This has 
changed fundamentally. Although the temporary help sector is still small compared to the 
European average, it is far from being a negligible source of labor turnover and net employ-
ment growth today. In the past five years, the sector has increased almost fourfold, accounting 
for 1.7 percent of the total workforce in 2007 (Windelin and Hansen 2007). This marked in-
crease comes as something of a surprise since the Danish labor market is relatively flexible 
and hardly any employment protection exists. Moreover, until late 2008, the Danish unem-
ployment rate was low and the labor market was considered to be tight. Since temporary 
agency jobs in Denmark usually provide less social benefits than other jobs do, one might 
surmise that workers had no incentive to take temporary agency jobs, such that the labor 
supply side may have rationed the market for temporary help services. However, the rapid 
growth of this sector may be the result of the intensified activation policies of the Danish pub-
lic employment service. Pedersen et al. (2003) and Oxford Research (2003) present evidence 
that the unemployed are increasingly seeking and accepting jobs with temporary agencies as a 
route back into regular employment. 
As in other European countries, there are concerns in Denmark whether temporary agency 
work traps workers in poor-quality jobs, or whether it might act as a bridge into regular em-
ployment – especially for individuals otherwise at risk of marginalization. Up to the present 
day, little research has been done on temporary agency employment in Denmark. The aim of 
this paper is to fill this gap.  
The theoretical impact of agency employment on the employment outcomes of the unem-
ployed is not clear a priori. On the one hand, temporary work may improve workers’ human 
capital and also provide them with labor market contacts that can later lead to stable employ-
2 ment (e.g., Houseman et al. 2003, Jahn & Ochel 2007).
1 In this case, temporary agencies may 
reduce the time job-seekers spend looking for a new job and may facilitate rapid entry into 
regular employment. This holds the more if client firms use temporary staffing arrangements 
to screen workers to fill open posts. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that any human capital effects arising from temp work 
cannot be strong due to the primarily short-term, low-skilled nature of temp jobs, which are 
often below the worker’s qualifications (Segal & Sullivan 1997). These jobs may even be 
dead-ends since firms may not plan to fill these jobs permanently, thus limiting the temp 
worker’s regular employment prospects (Heinrich et al. 2005). Consequently, temporary 
agency work might not provide significant opportunities to develop productive job search 
networks, and it may even crowd out direct job search, inhibiting longer-term labor market 
advancement. Which hypothesis holds remains an open empirical question (see Section 2). 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we take a comprehensive look 
at the stepping-stone effect of temporary agency employment in Denmark for the period 
1997-2006. Second, we take into account the different possible motivations for unemployed 
people to work as a temp. Although the majority of job-seekers probably accept temp work to 
avoid or escape unemployment, there may be also unemployed job-seekers who choose tem-
porary agency employment as a career choice, to obtain or prolong eligibility for unemploy-
ment benefits, or to combine family responsibilities with labor market participation (CIETT 
2002). Since the motivation to pursue temp work is usually not observable, it is important to 
separate the treatment effects from time-invariant unobserved variables affecting both the 
selection into temporary agency employment and the transition out of unemployment. The 
timing-of-events approach developed by Abbring & Van den Berg (2003) is ideal for taking 
selection based on observed and unobserved heterogeneity into account. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to employ this approach to model the in-treatment effect and 
post-treatment effect of taking a temporary agency job during a phase of unemployment.
2  
In tight labor markets, companies have more job openings, fewer qualified job applicants, 
and they may find it too costly to assess the productivity of the workers still in the pool of 
unemployed job-seekers. As temp agencies face lower hiring and firing costs than conven-
tional direct-hire employers do, they may choose to hire individuals, who would otherwise 
                                                 
1 To ease readability, we sometimes use the terms “temp job” and “agency work” interchangeably with “tempo-
rary agency employment”. 
2   De Graaf-Zijl et al. (2010) investigate, within the same framework, whether temporary employment acts as a 
stepping stone into regular employment in the Netherlands. Gagliarducci (2005) does the same for Italy and 
Göbel & Verhofstadt (2008) for Belgium, focusing on school leavers. However, none of these studies have 
been able to distinguish between temporary agency employment and direct-hire temporary employment. 
3 have difficulties finding regular employment. By this means, job-seekers can overcome the 
negative stigma associated with an extended unemployment period or certain educational or 
cultural backgrounds (e.g., Autor & Houseman 2002, Jahn 2010a, Katz & Krueger 1999). In 
order to investigate whether agency employment might work particularly well for some sub-
groups, we contribute to the literature, third, by estimating heterogeneous treatment effects.  
It is a well-known fact that the demand for temp workers moves pro-cyclically. If the labor 
market tightens, client firms use temp agencies not only to screen potential candidates to fill 
vacancies but also to buffer core workers in case demand declines in an economic downturn 
(e.g., Abraham 1990, Booth et al. 2002). Consequently, agency workers are the first to be laid 
off in a recession. We therefore test, fourth, whether the stepping-stone effect depends on the 
tightness of the labor market.  
Fifth, this is the first paper to shed light on the human capital hypothesis outlined above by 
investigating whether conditioning on the number and cumulative duration of past treatments 
during the current unemployment spell affects the results. If workers can indeed increase their 
human capital or build up productive job search networks during different assignments, we 
would expect that the hazard rate for non-temp jobs would increase with treatment intensity.  
Finally, we are interested not only in the causal effect on the job-finding rate for regular 
jobs, but also in the post-unemployment job and employment duration and in post-
unemployment wages, i.e., whether temporary agency employment might improve several 
aspects of subsequent employment quality. 
We find no evidence of a lock-in effect during treatment (i.e., while holding a temp job), 
and we find a fairly high positive post-treatment effect, increasing the transition rate into non-
temp employment by about 19 percent for men and 7 percent for women. Moreover, our re-
sults indicate that both the in-treatment and the post-treatment effects are stronger in regions 
and periods with tight labor markets. In addition, we find that temporary agency employment 
has particularly large impacts on non-western immigrants and their descendants.  
We provide also some evidence that the intensity of treatment affects the likelihood of 
finding a regular job; a larger number of weeks in treatment during the present unemployment 
spell decreases the job-finding rate during the current treatment, but increases the post-
treatment job-finding rate. A similar result is found when we condition on the number of dis-
tinct temp jobs earlier in the unemployment spell. 
Finally, we show that in Denmark, agency employment is a means to improve the quality 
of post-unemployment jobs, in terms of subsequent hourly wages, the duration of the first 
4 non-temp job after unemployment, and the total (uninterrupted) employment duration after 
unemployment. 
The results of this paper may be of interest to policy makers, since temporary agency em-
ployment shows potential as an instrument of active labor market policy. Some US states have 
already experimented with such instruments. While some researchers have advocated the in-
volvement of temporary agencies in job placement programs (Lane et al. 2003, Andersson et 
al. 2009), the study by Autor & Houseman (2005) argues that such a policy recommendation 
may be premature. Our results may be taken as an indication that temporary agency employ-
ment could be used successfully as an instrument of active labor market policy if targeted at 
the right treatment groups at the right times. 
The paper is organized as follows. A brief review of the empirical literature is provided in 
Section 2. Section 3 highlights key facts about the temporary help sector in Denmark. Section 
4 presents the estimation strategy. Section 5 introduces the data set and presents the main de-
scriptive statistics. In Section 6, we discuss the results, and in Section 7 we draw conclusions 
and provide a policy discussion. 
2. Empirical  Evidence 
As outlined in the introduction, the theoretical impact of agency employment on the unem-
ployed’s employment outcomes is not clear-cut. As a result, a growing literature has emerged, 
attempting to identify the effects of agency employment on subsequent labor market out-
comes. Yet even the empirical evidence is contradictory. No evidence of temporary work act-
ing as a springboard into regular employment has been found so far for Germany (Kvasnicka 
2009) or Spain (Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2008). Malo & Muñoz-Bullón (2008) show that temp 
work tends primarily to affect married women, and García-Pérez & Muñoz-Bullón (2005) 
show that temp work only affects young, short-term unemployed workers in Spain. In Italy, the 
effect on labor market outcomes depends on the region in question (Ichino et al. 2008). In 
general, it seems that rigid European labor market institutions do not facilitate successful tran-
sitions from temp work into permanent work. The American evidence is somewhat more 
promising. However, due to the different institutional background there, most US studies con-
centrate on the earnings and employment stability of low-wage earners or recipients of in-
come subsidies who enter the temporary help service sector. Overall, most studies suggest that 
5 temporary agency employment at least does not have any long-run negative effects on the 
outcomes of temp workers.
3 
To identify the causal effects of agency employment on the likelihood of obtaining a per-
manent job, the vast majority of studies use variants of the conditional independence assump-
tion (CIA), and concerns remain about selection on variables that are unobservable (Autor 
2009). The debate on whether the CIA may be violated has intensified since the study by Au-
tor & Houseman (2005). Using a quasi-experimental setting, they show that moving partici-
pants into temporary help jobs increases their short-term earnings. However, these effects are 
offset by lower earnings, less frequent employment, and higher welfare recidivism over the sub-
sequent two years.  
Our study contributes to this debate by employing the timing-of-events approach to model 
the causal effect of temporary agency employment on various labor market outcomes. The 
advantage of this approach is that it exploits the random variation in the timing of the treat-
ment to separate the time-varying treatment effects from the (assumed) time-invariant unob-
served variables affecting both selection into temporary agency employment and the transition 
into regular employment. 
3.  Temporary Agency Employment in Denmark 
Until 1990, the Danish temporary help sector was subject to comprehensive regulation. Since 
1990, more or less all regulations on establishing and operating a temporary employment 
agency have been removed. Consequently, there is free market access for all agencies except 
those serving the health care and transportation sectors. In the latter two cases, agencies need 
authorization to operate and are required to employ staff with a medical background or a vo-
cational degree in the transport sector, respectively. 
Collective bargaining at the industry, agency, and user-firm level also plays an important 
role in determining the conditions for temporary agency employment in Denmark, often re-
placing legal regulations.
4 About 80 percent of Danish temp workers are members of unem-
ployment insurance funds, which are operated by unions. Generally, standard labor law ap-
plies when hiring a temp worker. Nevertheless, agency workers who are employed for less 
than six to nine months at the same job are not protected by the act governing the legal rela-
tionship between employer and employee (Funtionærloven) and are usually not eligible for 
employment benefits such as maternity benefits, vacation pay, leave to care for a sick child, or 
                                                 
3   For example, Lane et al. (2003), Andersson et al. (2005, 2009), Hamersma & Heinrich (2008) and Heinrich 
et al. (2009). The results of these studies are discussed thoroughly in Autor (2009). 
4   A comprehensive and detailed description of the system of collective bargaining in the Danish temporary 
help service sector can be found in Arrowsmith (2008). 
6 disability pensions, or the right to at least one month’s notice of termination, which may ad-
versely affect agency workers on shorter contracts.  
Until recently, the temporary help sector was very small in Denmark. Temporary agency 
workers were mainly used to adapt the size of the workforce to fluctuations in demand and to 
temporarily replace permanent staff members who were on leave or sick. On the labor supply 
side, a lack of employment and income security, and frequent changes of working conditions, 
were among the reasons why most workers did not consider agency jobs to be attractive when 
alternative job offers were available. 
This has changed dramatically. Since 1997, the temporary help sector has undergone im-
pressive growth. The share of temporary agency workers (full-time equivalent) increased 
more than five-fold, from 0.2 percent in 1997 to 1.1 percent in 2007. This may be only the 
bottom line. If the share of temp workers is calculated as the number of persons who accepted 
a temp job, it totaled 1.7 percent of the workforce in 2007 (Windelin and Hansen 2007). 
Despite the fact that large agencies dominate the temporary help market, the number of 
registered agencies has increased considerably, from 305 in 2005 to 623 in 2007 (Mølgaard 
and Hansen 2008). Until 2002, the health care sector dominated the temp industry, but since 
then, it has been overtaken by the manufacturing, construction, and transport sectors (Kudsk-
Iversen & Andersen 2006). In 2007, the health care sector was responsible for 32 percent of 
total turnover in the temp industry; the industrial sector was responsible for 35 percent and the 
transport sector for 10 percent (Statistics Denmark 2009). As agency jobs have opened up in 
blue-collar occupations, the temporary help industry has become an increasingly important 
employer of less-skilled workers. 
There are several reasons responsible for the spectacular growth of the Danish temporary 
help service sector: First, the deregulation of temporary agency employment in 1990 may 
have increased incentives to enter the market. Second, the temporary help sector may serve as 
a stepping stone into the Danish labor market, not only for the unemployed but also for groups 
such as East European immigrants: 13 percent of the “work and stay” permits issued since 
2004 have been granted to East Europeans hired by temporary agencies (Andersen 2007). The 
growing pool of immigrants available for temporary agency employment may have attracted 
employers’ interest and demand in many sectors. 
Third, as a consequence of the tight labor market in Denmark, client firms often faced bot-
tlenecks when recruiting new workers. In response, temporary agencies specialized in identi-
fying agency workers’ skills and matching them with the staffing needs of firms. This offers 
employers the advantage of reducing the effective hiring costs associated with hiring new 
7 employees, and also enables them to screen workers for direct-hire positions and improve 
subsequent match quality. The screening device hypothesis may play a particularly important 
role on the Danish labor market: during our observation period, the pool of unemployed com-
prised many workers who would have difficulties to find employment through normal search 
channels. 
Fourth, temporary agency work is attractive to workers in the health care sector. According 
to anecdotal evidence, agency employment allows workers in the public health sector – espe-
cially nurses and doctors – not only to better determine their own working hours but also to 
bargain for higher wages. Jahn (2010b) shows that nurses employed through temp agencies 
indeed receive considerably higher wages than nurses employed in non-temp firms. 
Finally, recent research has refuted the assumption that most Danish temporary agency 
workers are accepting temp jobs by choice. According to Pedersen et al. (2003) and Oxford 
Research (2003), most of the temp workers interviewed in their field studies had chosen this 
form of employment out of financial need or a desire to escape unemployment. These find-
ings, in combination with the increased share of low-skilled workers in this sector, have fu-
eled the debate on whether temporary agency work improves or worsens unemployed 
people’s labor market chances. 
4. Econometric  Strategy 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether taking up a temporary agency job may be a 
bridge from unemployment to employment. Hence, our population of interest is individuals 
who have lost their jobs or who have otherwise become unemployed. Thus, we sample work-
ers at the point in time when they enter unemployment and analyze how long it takes them to 
find non-temp work and whether having worked for a temp agency while they were unem-
ployed accelerates this process. The duration modeled is therefore the time from becoming 
unemployed to finding a non-temp job. The take-up of temporary work during this period is 
considered the treatment, the effect of which we want to estimate.  
As unemployed workers do not take up agency jobs at random, we have to distinguish the 
causal effects of temporary agency employment from selection effects. As outlined in Section 
2, most European studies use the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) when analyz-
ing the stepping stone effect of temporary agency employment. However, if there are unob-
served variables influencing the selection process as well as the potential outcomes, the CIA 
approach will result in biased estimates. Albeit the data set at hand is quite detailed, it may be 
questionable whether the CIA holds as the motivation why unemployed workers would take 
up an agency job is a priori not obvious, as the discussion above shows. 
8 An alternative econometric approach may therefore be a duration model, analyzing the 
time from inflow into unemployment until non-temp employment is obtained, taking into ac-
count the endogenous choice of workers to accept agency work. Such an analysis aims at es-
timating the causal effect of working in the temporary help sector on the duration of unem-
ployment, or alternatively, on the exit rate from unemployment to regular employment. This 
is done by exploiting the timing-of-events approach formalized by Abbring and Van den Berg 
(2003). Exploiting random variation in the observed moment of transition from (full-time) 
unemployment to temporary agency employment, this approach is ideal for separating selec-
tion effects from causal effects. 
4.1 The  Timing-of-Events  Approach 
We consider being employed by a temporary agency during a spell of unemployment to be the 
treatment, and we then want to estimate the effect of this treatment on the exit rate from un-
employment to employment, both during and after the treatment. Let    be a continuous ran-
dom variable measuring the time from becoming unemployed to being hired into non-temp 
employment. Data on    are censored for those who remained unemployed until the last week 
of the observation period and for those making transitions out of the labor force. The hazard 
rate into a non-temp b P al M    job is assumed to  e a Mixed  roportion  Hazard ( PH): 
    | ,     ,      ,                                               
The hazard function is specified as the product of a baseline hazard,      , depending on 
the elapsed unemployment duration, and a scaling function depending on observed variables, 
 , unobserved heterogeneity that accounts for possible selectivity in the exit process   , and  
two time-varying indicators, one for being in treatment,       (i.e., being employed by a temp 
agency at time  ), and one for having been in treatment earlier,       (i.e., having been a temp 
during the current unemployment spell before   but not a temp at  ). The coefficients    and 
   thus capture the in-treatment and post-treatment effects of temp jobs on the hazard rate into 
non-temp employment, respectively.  
(1)
In the case of active labor market programs, one often observes that    is negative, i.e., that 
there is a lock-in effect. However, in the case of temporary agency employment, the sign of    
is not obvious. On the one hand, while on assignment, the temp worker has less time to search 
for a job outside the temp sector. On the other hand, it is well known that client firms also use 
temporary agency employment as a screening device. This may be particularly true in Den-
mark, where the labor market is considered to have been tight during most of the observation 
period. In this case, agency workers who possess the relevant skills may receive an offer for a 
9 permanent job faster than comparable individuals conducting their job search from open un-
employment.  
If γ2 is positive, it means that the skills or the network obtained during a temp job increases 
the subsequent chances of finding non-temp employment. On the other hand, a negative effect 
would normally be interpreted as some type of stigma. If temporary agency employment is to 
act as a bridge into non-temp employment, then either    or    (or both) should be positive. 
We model the baseline hazard us pi nstant specification:  ing a flexible,  ecewise-co




where     0,…,11 is a subscript for the (11) time intervals measured in weeks and       
are time-varying indicator variables for elapsed duration t. We split the analysis period during 
the first six months into monthly intervals. From the seventh month on, we split the time axis 
into quarterly intervals up to two years, a er whi h the exit rate is assumed to be constant.  ft c
In order to allow an interpretation of    and    as causal effects, we have to take into ac-
count the potential endogeneity of temporary agency employment. Let    denote the time 
from becoming unemployed until the person finds a temporary agency job. Note that we con-
sider temp periods to be part of the unemployment spell, hence, if    is observed, it is shorter 
than   . Following the notation used above and specifying once again an MPH function, the 
transition rate into temporary agency jobs is specified as: 
    | ,                          
The unobserved random variables,    and   , are allowed to be correlated, which implies a 
correction for the potential endogeneity of the treatment status. 
Note that random variation in the timing of the beginning of the treatment identifies the 
causal effect of the treatment under the assumption that unobserved characteristics are time-
invariant and that there is no anticipation of treatment.
5 Their distribution is approximated 
non-parametrically by a bivariate discrete distribution with M mass points (Heckman & Sing-
er 1984 and Gaure et al. 2007). Moreover, note that due to the random variation in the timing 
of treatment, no exclusion restriction is necessary to identify the parameters of this model 
non-parametrically. The only assumption necessary, beyond the assumption of mixed propor-
                                                 
5   With multi-spell data, identification does not depend completely on the proportionality assumption when we 
assume the unobserved heterogeneity term to be constant over time for each individual (Abbring & Van den 
Berg 2003). Furthermore, the proportionality assumption is not needed for identification provided that we ob-
serve a sufficient amount of variation in covariates over time and across observations (Brinch 2007, Gaure et 
al. 2007). 
10 tionally hazards, is one of non-anticipation; that is, the individual is not supposed to know in 
advance the exact starting date of the agency job, only its probability distribution. This as-
sumption is crucial to rule out changes in behavior before the actual treatment takes place. As 
long as the individual does not know the exact starting date too long in advance, this is gener-
ally not perceived as a problem. In the case of temporary agency jobs, where workers are of-
ten called the same morning that the job begins, this is hardly a large problem.  
Let    be a non-censoring indicator that takes the value of 1 if spell   was completed by a 
transition into a non-temp job before the end of the observation period, and zero otherwise. 
The likelihood function for individual   with    nemployment spells is specified as,   u
    ,            ,    
 
   
  
where  
     ,            |  ,    
          
      |  ,        ,        ,      
                |  ,    
   
 
           |  ,      ,      ,      
   
 
   
 
In all estimations performed, we first estimate the model without unobserved heterogenei-
ty, and then we proceed by adding additional points of support to the distribution of unobser-
vables until the likelihood does not improve enough to satisfy the Akaike Information Crite-
rion. This procedure typically results in about six support points in the final estimation. Para-
meter estimates of treatment effects typically start to stabilize after the third or fourth support 
point has been added.  
4.2  Modeling Heterogeneous Effects  
We estimate heterogeneous effects by allowing the effects to depend on the observable cha-
racteristics, and we assume that all heterogeneity is captured in this way. Conditional on ob-
servables, the effects are assumed to be homogenous, and hence, we do not have to distin-
guish between the average treatment effect on the treated and the average treatment effect as 
long as we condition on observable characteristics (Heckman et al. 1999).  
To estimate heterogeneous effects of temporary agency employment, we augment the set 
of characteristics by including interaction terms between a subset of the characteristics, 
  , and the two treatment indicators       and       . This implies that the effect of agency 
employment is allowed to vary with these characteristics. Apart from a larger set of parame-
11 ters, the estimation procedure is as before, and the hazard function out of unemployment to 
em t ploymen  can be written as  
    | ,       ,                       1              1                        ,   
Where  1     is a (K+1) vector of characteristics, and    is a (K + 1) parameter vector, and 
similarly for   . 
(2)
Moreover, we test whether the treatment is more effective when labor markets are tight, as 
we have hypothesized. This is done by interacting the treatment dummies with the local un-
employment rate.  
Finally, we investigate how the treatment effects depend on the treatment intensity. We 
construct two measures of treatment intensity; the first is a time-varying variable, which 
measures, at elapsed duration t, the number of temp jobs held during the unemployment spell 
up until time t. The second variable is also time-varying, and it measures the accumulated 
number of weeks spent in treatment until time t. 
4.3  Modeling Post-Unemployment Outcomes 
In the next step, we extend the basic timing-of-events model by looking beyond the unem-
ployment spell at some indicators of job quality. We want to investigate whether holding a 
temp job affects the hourly wages in the subsequent job and the duration of that job spell and 
employment spell, where an employment spell is defined as a sequence of non-interrupted job 
spells.  
For wages, we try two different approaches; first, we distinguish between transitions into 
employment that pay better than the pre-unemployment job and transitions to regular jobs that 
pay worse or the same as the pre-unemployment job. To do so, we separate the transition rate 
to employment into (1) the hazard rate into a better-paying job (than the one held before un-
employment)     | ,     ,      ,     and into (2) the hazard rate into a worse or equally 
paying job     | ,     ,      ,    . For some individuals, we do not observe the pre-
unemployment wage, and in this case, the exit rate from unemployment to employment used 
in the likelihood function is the sum of    .  and    . . These two destination specific ha-
zard rates are both specified as MPH’s as in equation (1) above. The treatment parameters in 
   .  provide information on how the probability of leaving unemployment for a better-
paying job is affected by a temp agency spell, that is, if treatment improves the chances of 
obtaining a better-paying job when compared to non-treatment. 
An alternative approach is to model the post-treatment wage explicitly by specifying a log-
normal distribution for the post-unemployment wage, that is, 




              
 
 , 
where   .  denotes the pdf of the standard normal distribution. The parameters of this model 
are then estimated jointly with those of the model specified in section 4.1, extending the dis-
tribution of unobservables to be trivariate. The advantage of this specification is that we are 
able to present estimates of the size of the wage advantage or disadvantage compared to the 
control group as well. 
Moreover, within the same framework we evaluate the effects of temporary agency em-
ployment on subsequent job and employment stability. First, we analyze the impact of tempo-
rary agency employment on the duration of the first non-temp job, starting immediately after 
unemployment exit. A job spell is defined as the number of consecutive weeks in employment 
with the same employer. Second, we perform the same analysis with respect to the employ-
ment stability, analyzing the duration of uninterrupted employment, which may consist of a 
sequence of job spells. Denote by     and    the job and employment duration, respectively. 
The hazard ra j te out of  ob or employment is also specified as an MPH: 
    | ,  ,   ,                                       ,      i   e,j     
Note that here the two treatment indicators    and    are time-invariant, since they meas-
ure whether the person made a transition into a non-temp job directly from a temp job (    
1) or from open unemployment following a temp job (    1 ). Once again, the model of the 
likelihood function in section 4.1 is extended to include the contribution to the likelihood 
function from the job or employment duration model, that is, we jointly estimate employment 
(or job-) duration, unemployment duration, and the duration until a temp job (the treatment). 
Unobserved variables in all hazard rates are allowed to be correlated, as in the basic model.  
5.  Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics 
Our empirical analysis is based on two rich sets of Danish register data. Our primary data set 
is an extract from a matched employer-employee data set, which contains weekly information 
on all persons aged 16 to 75 living in Denmark. The data set is compiled from a variety of 
sources maintained by Statistics Denmark. It records all transitions between employment, 
unemployment, participation in programs of active labor market policy, and being outside the 
labor force, and it also provides accurate information on the establishment in which the work-
er is employed and the hourly wages in the current job. To this data set, we match additional 
socio-economic information available from the Integrated Database for Labour Market Re-
search (IDA), which is also maintained by Statistics Denmark. As the combined data set al-
13 lows us to construct the (un-)employment careers of workers, which is exact to the week, it is 
especially suitable for performing duration analyses. Due to its administrative nature, the data 
set can be considered highly reliable. 
Nevertheless, the data set has one minor limitation: we can identify employment spells in 
temporary help agencies only by an industry classification code. This implies that temp work-
ers cannot be distinguished from the permanent administrative staff of temporary employment 
agencies. However, we do not expect that this affects our estimations, since the absolute num-
ber of the permanent staff members in the data set is likely to be small, and we concentrate 
our analysis on temp workers who were unemployed before accepting the temp job.
6 
For the analysis, we use all individuals aged 16 to 60 who were employed by a temp agen-
cy at least once during an unemployment spell starting in the period 1997 to 2006, and a two 
percent random sample of all other individuals aged 16 to 60 starting an unemployment spell 
during the same period. There is also information available for the period 1994 to 1996, and 
this is used to construct the previous employment history of the job-seekers. 
An unemployment spell is defined as a sequence of weeks during which a person receives 
either UI benefits, is in some type of active labor market policy program, or is employed at a 
temp agency. Thus, agency employment is treated as a part of the unemployment spell in or-
der to enable the counterfactual analysis. Unemployment spells continuing until the end of the 
sample period are treated as independently right-censored observations (about 3.9 percent of 
all spells).  
The dependent variable is the unemployment duration measured in weeks. The two expla-
natory variables of interest are the time-varying indicator of being employed as a temp work-
er, and the time-varying indicator of having been employed as a temp worker at a previous 
time during the current unemployment spell. We define the destination “regular employment” 
as non-temp employment and self-employment.
7 
In order to concentrate on workers who accept an agency job because of a lack of alterna-
tives outside the sector, the following selection decisions are made. First, our treatment group 
only includes temp workers who received unemployment insurance benefits or unemployment 
                                                 
6   For Germany, Antoni and Jahn (2009) provide evidence that permanent agency staff members account for 
about 7 percent of the stock of all workers identified as temp workers via the industry classification code. In 
the inflow to temp jobs from unemployment, this ratio is likely to be considerably lower, since the staff of 
temp agencies obviously experience fewer transitions into and out of jobs than the temp workers themselves. 
7   One might argue that self-employment (out of unemployment) is often as precarious as temporary agency 
jobs. We therefore estimated the model defining the destination only as salary or wage employment. The re-
sults are nearly identical to those reported in Table 1 and are available upon request. 
14 assistance before entering temp employment.
8 Second, we only include temp spells if the 
temporary agency job is the primary job. By making this selection, we are able to exclude 
those who take temp work to increase their income. Third, unemployed job-seekers often try 
to escape unemployment by upgrading their education, but do temp work at the same time to 
augment their income. Since their motivation might not be primarily to find employment out-
side the sector, we exclude all previously unemployed temps who are attending formal educa-
tion. Fourth, as mentioned earlier, there is some evidence that the reason for accepting a temp 
job in the health sector may be driven mainly by income motives. Therefore, we exclude all 
individuals who are educated as nurses or as medical doctors. 
Finally, we exclude temp workers who hold top management positions, as it is likely that 
they belong to the permanent staff of the agency. For the same reason, we exclude temp 
workers with a temp spell lasting more than one year. After this sample selection, the sample 
consists of 75,632 individuals experiencing a total of 260,672 unemployment spells. 
We present all results separately by gender, as the kind of jobs vary considerably between 
these two groups. While men are mainly assigned to the construction and manufacturing sec-
tor, women are more likely to be found in the trade and service sector. 
In addition, the following socio-demographic variables are used: age (5 categories), single 
or not, ethnic origin (5 groups), child in the household, child below age of 7 in the household, 
and a dummy variable that indicates whether the partner is employed. In addition, we have 
five educational variables, information on the UI fund (nine occupation/industry-related 
funds), and a dummy variable that indicates whether or not the worker is a member of a UI 
fund, which implies that the worker receives unemployment assistance. 
As a proxy for the human capital of the worker, we use the employment history of the past 
three years: previously employed (in the temporary help sector, self-employed, or in regular 
employment, the latter of which is the reference category), sick, or out of the labor force. 
Moreover, we control for the total fraction of time spent in employment during the past three 
years, the number of temp and regular jobs held, and the number of programs of active labor 
market policy that the worker attended during the past three years. Finally, we include dum-
mies for the year and quarter of entry into the current unemployment spell as well as the re-
gional unemployment rate (based on 14 counties). All controls, except for the two main ex-
planatory variables, are measured at the beginning of the unemployment spell and will be 
treated as time-invariant regressors, which are fixed for each single spell but can vary over 
different spells for the same person.  
                                                 
8   This decision is also motivated by the fact that the model implemented cannot deal with selection at time 
zero. 
15 [Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 presents an overview of events and outcomes for the treated and the untreated 
group separated by gender. As there are only small differences between men and women, we 
report in the following the results for the pooled sample. The observations refer to unem-
ployment spells, not to individuals. Of the 260,672 unemployment spells, 25,473 involve at 
least one temporary agency work spell. Clearly, there are strong differences in the median 
duration of unemployment. Median search for a regular job lasts about 10 weeks for the un-
treated group and 33 weeks for individuals who experienced a temp spell during unemploy-
ment. The median (mean) time until first accepting an agency job is about 10 (21) weeks. The 
median (mean) duration of a temp spell is about 5 (9) weeks and the average number of sepa-
rate temp spells (separated by unemployment) during a given unemployment spell is 1.6; 
7,430 or about 29 percent of the unemployment spells of the treated group experienced more 
than one temp job during the unemployment spell. Table 1 also shows that 77 (79) percent of 
the male (female) treated group ultimately ended up in regular employment. This is only the 
case for 61 (66) percent of the comparison group.  
The sample statistics reveal that there are only minor differences in terms of background 
characteristics between the treated and the untreated.
9 Women are more likely to experience a 
temporary agency spell during unemployment and they are slightly older (36 years of age) 
than their male counterparts (33 years of age). The treated are on average about one year 
younger than the untreated, and are more often single (76 vs. 73 percent for men and 62 vs. 56 
percent for women). Among the immigrants, only the first-generation non-western immi-
grants appear underrepresented among the treated. However, compared to the national aver-
age, immigrants are overrepresented in the pool of unemployed. During the observation pe-
riod, the mean regional unemployment rate was about 5.9 (standard deviation 1.4). As a con-
sequence of the tightness of the Danish labor market, the educational attainment of the unem-
ployed is low. On average, 47 percent of workers do not have any vocational training or fur-
ther education. Compared to the untreated, the treated group is slightly better qualified, indi-
cating that some qualifications might be an advantage in finding even temp jobs. 
Regarding the previous employment history of the unemployed, the differences are more 
pronounced. The treated group held on average 0.8 temp jobs during the past three years be-
fore becoming unemployed, while the untreated held on average only 0.4 temp jobs. About 51 
                                                 
9   The sample statistics can be found in Table A1. Table A2 informs about the number of cases excluded for the 
above-mentioned reasons. Basically, we could not find major differences between the selected and the full 
sample. All appendix tables will be available to the interested reader online or upon request. 
16 percent of the untreated were previous to the unemployment spell regular employed, while 
this was only the case for 37 percent of the treatment group. 
6. Results 
6.1  Empirical Hazards and Selection into Treatment 
Figure 1 shows, first, the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the transition rate from unemployment to 
temporary agency employment as a function of elapsed unemployment duration; second, the 
hazard rate from unemployment to regular employment for unemployed who did not hold a 
temp job during unemployment (the untreated); and third, the hazard rate to regular employ-
ment for the treated individuals. All durations are measured from the time of unemployment 
entry in weeks. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The hazard rate to temporary employment measures the probability of entering temporary 
employment in the next week for those who are unemployed at the beginning of each week. 
As stated in Section 4, a key identifying assumption is that we observe some exogenous varia-
tion in the time until being treated. Figure 1 shows that there is indeed a great deal of variation 
in these durations. The hazard rate to agency employment for men starts at about 0.6 percent 
per week and decreases over the first year of unemployment to a level of around 0.2 percent. 
The hazard rate to agency employment for unemployed women starts at a slightly higher level 
(0.7 percent) and, similarly to the hazard rate for the men, decreases gradually during the first 
year of unemployment to 0.3 percent.  
The hazard rates to regular employment for the untreated start at a level of 5 percent for 
men and 7 percent for women and gradually decrease thereafter. Interestingly, the hazard rate 
to employment jumps up after one year for women, with an additional bump after 6 months. 
One reason may be that Denmark uses instruments of active labor market policy quite inten-
sively. After one year (26 weeks for young workers and workers above 60), participation in 
active labor market programs becomes compulsory.  
Finally, Figure 1 displays the hazard rates to employment for the treated unemployed. The 
exit rate for the treated starts, by construction, very low (since they have a treatment period 
before leaving unemployment), peaks at about 2 percent after 26 weeks of job search have 
elapsed, stays constant for another 6 months, and tapers off gradually to the original value of 
just 1 percent per week after 120 weeks of elapsed unemployment duration. Moreover, after 
six months, the exit rate for the treated lies well above the hazard rate for the non-treated. This 
pattern suggests that the dynamics of the job search process are important, as conditioning on 
17 unemployment duration is obviously crucial when estimating treatment effects - the treated 
are found among those who did not find a regular job shortly after becoming unemployed. 
Moreover, it suggests that taking into account the dynamics of the selection process is impor-
tant as well. It also implies that either there is a fairly strong treatment effect, or that the 
treated and untreated differ considerably in observable or unobservable ways. 
Results of the selection equation (time until a temp job) and the main equation (time until 
ordinary employment) are shown in appendix Table A3 for the model with homogenous 
treatment effects and six support points. For the sake of brevity, we will not report these in 
any detail, but we will briefly mention the main patterns in the selection equation.  
First of all, duration dependence in the selection equation is slightly hump-shaped, with a 
peak at 12-16 weeks for men and at 8-16 weeks for women. Young workers below the age of 
24 have a much higher transition rate to temp jobs than older workers. Workers aged 45 or 
more have a considerably lower transition rate into temp jobs than those between 25 and 44. 
Living with a working partner in the household (married or not) is associated with a higher 
probability of receiving treatment compared to all other family status categories. Women with 
children have a lower transition rate into treatment, especially if there is a child below seven 
years of age in the household.  
The transition rate into temp jobs for non-western immigrants is considerably lower than 
for Danes and western immigrants. Moreover, we find that the least skilled workers, without 
any formal educational qualifications, are much less likely to take temp jobs than those with 
vocational or short academic education. Unemployed workers with a master’s degree or high-
er are the least likely to take temp work. Finally, the transition rate into temporary work in-
creases with the fraction of time the person was employed during the past three years. 
6.2  Unobserved Heterogeneity and Treatment Effects 
In order to estimate homogenous treatment effects across individuals, we proceed as follows. 
We first estimate a basic duration model with flexible baseline, no unobserved heterogeneity, 
no selection, and only the two main explanatory variables (in-treatment and post-treatment). 
Second, we estimate the same model but adding the covariates described in Section 5. Third, 
we estimate the full timing-of-events model, starting from a two point distribution of unob-
servables. These first three models indicate that there are significant positive in-treatment ef-
fects as well as post-treatment effects.
10 
                                                 
10   The results are provided in Table A4, which will be available online. 
18 We proceed, next, by estimating the same model, allowing sequentially for extra mass 
points as described in section 4.1, freeing up the correlation structure of the unobservables. 
We add mass points as long as the Akaide Information Criterion improves (see, e.g., Gaure et 
al. 2007). It turns out that the in-treatment and post-treatment coefficients barely change after 
adding three to four mass points. The results after adding approximately six support points, 
which is most often the optimal number, are in Table 2.  
There are no significant in-treatment effects, which mean that currently working for a temp 
agency does not significantly affect the transition rate to non-temp employment on average, 
when compared to a similar person in open unemployment. On the other hand, having worked 
for a temp agency at least once earlier in the same unemployment spell causes a significant 
increase in the hazard rate to ordinary employment of almost 20 percent for men and about 7 
percent for women. Since this is a multiplicative effect, and since the expected duration of 
remaining unemployment duration after completion of a temp job is a probability-weighted 
average (over all possible exit times) of the inverse of the exit rate to ordinary employment, 
the implication is that the remaining unemployment spells are shortened by about 20 percent 
for men, and by about 7 percent for women.
11 
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 also presents results for the models with heterogeneous treatment effects, provid-
ing a deeper analysis of how in-treatment and post-treatment effects vary among unemployed 
job-seekers from different ethnic and educational backgrounds.
12 
Turning first to the results on immigrant status, Table 2 shows that treated immigrants, es-
pecially those of non-western origin, leave unemployment considerably faster than the un-
treated, with exit rate increases between 15 and 85 percent. This is the case both during and 
after treatment.  
As for the educational groups, we observe that for most male groups, the in-treatment ef-
fect is actually positive, increasing the exit rate to ordinary employment by around 9 percent, 
the exception being men with vocational training who have a lock-in effect of 13 percent.
13 
For women, significant lock-in effects are observable for unemployed with medium academic 
education (17 percent), while there are no significant in-treatment effects for the rest of the 
                                                 
11  As a robustness check, we run the model on the full sample as well. The exclusion of nurses, students, and 
top managers in the baseline model does not fundamentally affect our results. The lock-in effect becomes 
significant and the hazard rate shifts up. As described in Section 3, this result is somewhat expected because 
of the peculiar role the temporary help service industry plays in the health sector in Denmark. 
12   Results for further subgroups can be found in the appendix, Table A5. 
13   Calculated as (exp(0.0870-0.2252)-1). 
19 educational groups. The post-treatment effect appears significantly positive for all educational 
groups. 
To sum up, the considerable positive in-treatment effects, in particular for the immigrants 
and the least-skilled men, are an indication that firms use temp employment as a screening 
device in a tight labor market, where high-ability workers are costly to spot. In general, the 
post-treatment effects for women are somewhat lower than those for men. It would certainly 
seem valid to conclude that temporary agency employment does no harm to unemployed 
workers, neither during nor after the temp job. Conversely, it seems that for most subgroups, 
temporary agency employment significantly reduces the remaining time spent in unemploy-
ment and thus serves as a stepping stone to employment. Only for very few groups is the evi-
dence mixed in the sense that temporary agency work has a lock-in effect while doing temp 
work, reducing the transition rate into ordinary jobs, but also has a positive post-treatment 
effect.  
6.3  Effects of Labor Market Tightness and Treatment Intensity 
Why is temporary agency work in Denmark such a successful strategy for escaping unem-
ployment, while it hardly works at all in other European countries? One explanation could be 
that the tightness of the Danish labor market is “responsible.” As outlined in Section 3, the 
unemployment rate during our observation period was rather low. Consequently, firms had 
difficulties finding qualified workers. According to anecdotal evidence, there was fierce com-
petition between firms to find qualified workers, and firms even lured qualified workers away 
from competitors by offering generous fringe benefits. Therefore, it is plausible that agencies 
specialized in identifying job-seekers in the pool of unemployed in order to meet the staffing 
needs of user firms. At the same time, user firms employed these workers first as temporary 
agency workers in order to screen them before hiring them to take permanent positions. De-
spite the rather lax employment protection in Denmark, this might be an optimal strategy 
since it allows firms to avoid both large turnover costs and negative reputation effects if these 
workers do not prove to match the requirements or if demand declines. 
In order to examine whether the labor market tightness or the business cycle might have 
some explanatory power, we included an interaction term in the basic model between the 
time-varying treatment indicators and the deviation of the local unemployment rate from the 
mean unemployment rate of 5.7 during our observation period. The results are reported in 
Table 3.  
[Table 3 about here] 
20 Table 3 reveals that there is indeed a significant lock-in effect visible in regions and/or pe-
riods with above-average unemployment rates and positive in-treatment effects in low-
unemployment regions (or periods). An unemployment rate one percentage point above the 
average implies a lock-in effect of about 7 percent. Low unemployment rates, on the other 
hand, lead to similar positive in-treatment effects. In addition, the post-treatment effect falls 
by about 3 percent if the regional unemployment rate is one percentage point above-average. 
This result may be taken as additional evidence for the screening device hypothesis and/or as 
evidence that the stepping-stone function of agency work is strongly procyclical.  
According to the proponents of the stepping-stone effect of agency work, job-seekers can 
improve their human capital while being on assignment, while critics point out that the human 
capital effect may be low. Whether there are human capital effects responsible for the suc-
cessful transition into employment cannot be tested directly. However, one way to approach 
this question is to investigate whether the number of treatments earlier in the unemployment 
spell or the cumulative duration of treatment might increase the likelihood of finding ordinary 
employment. Table 3 reveals that the hazard rate into ordinary employment while in treatment 
decreases with the total number of weeks in treatment in the past (during the current unem-
ployment spell), while the post-treatment hazard rate increases with the (accumulated) num-
ber of past weeks in treatment. This could suggest that some individuals like their temp jobs 
and therefore tend to stay. At the same time, the positive treatment effect might indicate that 
longer treatments might indeed improve the human capital and therefore increase the likelih-
ood of exiting unemployment to permanent jobs.  
Conditioning instead on the number of distinct temp job spells earlier in the unemployment 
spell reveals that there are no significant effects for men, but it seems that the hazard rate in-
creases considerably for women with at least two treatments. Cinsidering+ both results to-
gether it seems that apparently the (accumulated) duration of the temp spells may be more 
decisive than the number of treatments. One possible explanation could be that human capital 
can only be accumulated if the worker is employed for a longer period, but that experience in 
different firms - which expands the worker’s professional network - is advantageous primarily 
for female temps. 
Summing up, we find strong procyclical treatment effects, suggesting that labor market 
tightness may be decisive not just for the size but also for the sign of the impact of taking a 
temp job during unemployment. Moreover, we find some suggestive evidence of human capi-
tal effects or network effects of taking a temp job. 
21 6.4  Post-Unemployment Wages, Job Stability, and Employment Stability 
Despite the positive results presented until now, one might still worry that subsequent job 
quality, as measured by job or employment stability or by the level of hourly wages, is worse 
for the treated unemployed who found a regular job after leaving unemployment. One reason 
might be that having held a temp job may be interpreted as a negative signal by prospective 
employers, causing them to offer lower wages or less stable jobs. In this section, we investi-
gate the effect of temporary agency employment on the quality of jobs found. In order to in-
vestigate the effect on post-unemployment wages, we proceed in two ways. First, we define 
that a worker experiences upward mobility if the job found after leaving unemployment pays 
more than the job prior to entering unemployment. If the job pays the same or less, then the 
worker experiences downward mobility. As job-seekers enter unemployment from a different 
labor force status, we only consider pre-unemployment wages if the worker has been em-
ployed at least three weeks before entering unemployment and if the job-seeker found wage 
and salary employment three weeks after leaving unemployment.
14 As noted in Section 4, 
addressing this issue with the timing-of-events approach requires specifying a competing risks 
model that takes into account the joint determination of experiencing a temporary agency em-
ployment spell and the hazards of leaving unemployment for a better or worse-paid job com-
pared to the wages before entering unemployment. Second, we specify a lognormal wage eq-
uation for the post-unemployment wage, as described in Section 4.  
 [Table 4 about here] 
Table 4, which reports the results for post-unemployment wages, shows that unemployed 
persons who found a job while working for an employment agency are much more likely to 
earn a higher wage and much less likely to earn a lower wage. The hazard rate into better jobs 
increases by 56 percent for men and by 53 percent for women. Presumably, this reflects, at 
least to some extent, a screening mechanism by which temps are hired into permanent jobs by 
the firms where they are temping.  
If the unemployed job-seeker finds a job after having completed a temp job, then they are 
not less likely to get a job paying a higher wage but more likely to get a job paying a lower 
wage (59 percent for men and 45 percent for women) than those who did not previously hold 
a temp job. The upward shift in the hazard rate into worse-paid jobs after the worker has left 
the employment agency suggests that treated job seekers are becoming less selective in terms 
of the jobs they are willing to accept than they were before unemployment. There may be two 
                                                 
14   Employers report the gross earnings of their employees for the period the worker has been employed, but at 
least once a year. The wage refers to the average hourly wage during the notification period. Note that the da-
ta set does not report income of the unemployed that leave unemployment for self-employment. 
22 reasons for this result: first, the reservation wages might decrease if the treated do not receive 
a job offer from the client firm immediately. A second interpretation may be that leaving a 
temp job unsuccessfully, that is, without a permanent job offer, may be interpreted by em-
ployers as a signal of low productivity. It could be, therefore, that future employers offer these 
individuals lower wages than other workers would receive. 
Moreover, we estimated the effect of the treatment on the post-unemployment wage direct-
ly. Here, we did not control for the previous wage, as this is only observed for those who were 
employed immediately before becoming unemployed. All variables included in the hazard 
rates, however, were also included in the wage regressions. The results in the lower part of 
Table 4 repeat, first of all, the results found in the competing risks model: only workers who 
exit unemployment while in treatment are able to increase their wages, while there is no sig-
nificant effect for workers who find employment after treatment (the post-treatment effect). 
The results indicate that female workers receive on average wages that are about 4 percent 
above the wages of comparable untreated workers. For men, the effect is even more pro-
nounced: their jobs pay 6 percent more than those of the untreated. 
In a final step, we analyze the causal effect of having had a temporary agency employment 
spell during the unemployment spell on the subsequent job and employment duration. First, as 
a short-term indicator, we use the stability of the subsequent job immediately after leaving 
unemployment. As with post-unemployment wages, this variable again may be taken as an 
indicator of whether the match quality in the first job improves.  
As a long-term outcome, we use, second, employment stability, measuring the number of 
weeks a person is employed after leaving unemployment, defined as the number of weeks 
employed without interruption after leaving successful unemployment - that is, unemploy-
ment terminating in a job offer. In this case, workers are allowed to switch jobs.
15 
[Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 reports results from a set of models where the basic model is extended to include 
either subsequent employment or job duration. The results show that having had a temp job 
during unemployment has only negligible impacts on subsequent employment and job stabili-
ty. Only the coefficient for the in-treatment effect for unemployed women is significant, im-
plying that women who find a job while in treatment have longer job and employment dura-
                                                 
15   The employment career is considered as uninterrupted as long as there are no gaps lasting longer than three 
weeks. The reason for this decision is that there may be reporting gaps if a worker ends or starts a new job in 
the middle of the week. Moreover, the data reveal that reporting gaps increase during the summer vacation 
period. The likely reason is that workers with job changes during the summer often have a period of vacation 
typically lasting three weeks before they start a new job. As a robustness check, we allowed a reporting gap 
of only one week, which did not change the general results. 
23 tions. This picture confirms the results of the post-unemployment wages. The reason may be 
that client firms often use temporary agency employment as a screening device. If the temp 
worker proves to be productive, then the client firm may hire the former agency worker di-
rectly. As the client firm already knows the true productivity of the worker, theory would pre-
dict that the worker-job match is of higher quality and, consequently, that subsequent job du-
ration is longer for those who received a job offer during or directly after the temp job. 
To sum up, those who find a job while in treatment increase their post-unemployment 
wages and also experience longer post-unemployment job and employment durations; that is, 
temp jobs tend to improve subsequent job quality. 
7. Conclusion 
The rapid growth of temporary agency employment in Denmark has led to doubts as to 
whether this form of employment is a desirable way of increasing labor market flexibility, as 
employment protection in Denmark is already low and flexibility is high. This holds the more 
as agency jobs do provide lower social and employment benefits than other jobs. Neverthe-
less, temporary agency work may have potential as a means of integrating workers who would 
otherwise have problems finding employment on their own. On the other hand, there is a risk 
that these are dead-end jobs. Answering this question for workers who enter agency employ-
ment after a period of unemployment is of special interest, since this group might be the most 
vulnerable with respect to their future employment prospects. 
We use the timing-of-events model to estimate causal effects of temporary agency em-
ployment by taking selection based on observed and unobserved variables into account. First, 
we do not find any evidence of a lock-in effect. On the contrary: estimating heterogeneous 
effects reveals that for some groups, temporary agency employment even speeds up the transi-
tion out of unemployment benefits. In addition, we find a positive post-treatment effect of 
having experienced at least one temporary agency spell during the unemployment spell across 
individuals. The groups that benefit most from temporary agency employment are non-
western immigrants, second generation non-western immigrants, and unemployed job-seekers 
with a low educational background, groups which are usually considered hard to integrate into 
the labor market. It seems that they are able to build up their human capital or enlarge their 
professional networks, and, ultimately, improve their labor market and career prospects. 
Moreover, we found evidence that the likelihood of exiting unemployment successfully in-
creases with the duration of the treatment and to some extent with the number of treatments.  
Why is temporary agency employment such a successful path into regular employment in 
Denmark when the evidence is much less promising in other European countries? The posi-
24 tive in-treatment effects found for groups that are often at risk of being excluded from the 
labor market due to stigma effects may indicate that employers facing labor shortages used 
temporary agency employment to screen candidates for permanent jobs. In a downturn, when 
the pool of highly qualified job-seekers swells again, employers might return to traditional 
(and cheaper) direct-hire strategies. To test this assumption, we investigated whether the step-
ping-stone effect depends on the tightness of the labor market. Our results indeed confirm that 
the stepping-stone effect reacts strongly to the unemployment rate in a procyclical manner, 
i.e., the effects are more positive when unemployment is lower. We therefore believe that one 
reason for the positive stepping-stone effect of temporary agency employment in Denmark is 
the tight labor market there.  
Even if temp work may be a bridge to regular employment, it is crucial to know what hap-
pens to the quality of a job match once a worker leaves unemployment. Research evidence on 
this question is of high policy relevance and entirely missing for the continental European 
countries. A worsening of post-unemployment job quality would be a reason to be cautious 
about promoting temporary agency employment in an economy that is already highly flexible. 
Our results suggest that unemployed job-seekers not only gain in terms of employment proba-
bility; women who leave unemployment while in treatment tend to enjoy longer and more 
stable employment than the control group. Moreover, those exiting unemployment while in 
treatment gain in terms of wages as well. The latter results may again support our assumption 
that the screening of workers may have played an important role for employers using agency 
workers. 
As temporary agency employment has features of an ALMP instrument, the question natu-
rally arises whether public employment offices should consider utilizing temporary help ser-
vices more often as part of their overall job placement strategies. Denmark is spending about 
2 percent of its GDP on ALMPs (OECD 2009). Despite these tremendous expenses, studies 
have generally shown that the effects of most such programs are modest and sometimes even 
negative (e.g., Card et al. 2009). In Denmark, activation policies that involve some real work-
ing experience for unemployed workers seem to be most effective (see, e.g., Kyyrä et al. 
2009, Rosholm & Svarer 2008, Jespersen et al. 2008). Almost all other program types show 
remarkably large lock-in effects. This may be a consequence of the fact that these instruments 
prolong benefit periods and discourage workers from searching for a regular job while in acti-
vation. Our findings suggest that temporary agency employment may be a useful alternative 
instrument of active labor market policy, since it also speeds up the exit from unemployment 
for some groups. This would offer an important source of cost savings since actively involv-
25 ing temporary agencies in the job placement strategies of the public employment service 
would come at almost no cost. 
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Table 1: Overview of events and outcomes 
  Men Women 
  Temp Non  Temp Temp Non  Temp 
Number  of  unemployment  spells  11,224 112,205 14,249 122,994 
Number  of  persons  3,824 31,810 5,557 34,441 
Share  right-censored  spells  2.82 4.07 2.92 3.86 
      
Median unemployment duration in weeks   33.00  10.00  32.00  9.00 
Median  duration  of  agency  spell  6.00  5.00  
Median time until first accepting a temp job  11.00    10.00   
      
Mean  number  of  agency  spells  1.43  1.74  
Share of workers with more than one treatment  24.79    32.62   
      
Percent of unemployment spells  
ending in employment  76.67 61.18 78.80 65.97 
      
Mean wage before unemployment (DKK)  122  129.00  121.00  122 
Mean wage after unemployment (DKK)  126  132.00  120.00  125 
      
Median job stability in weeks (completed)  22  11  32  7 





Fig 1: Smoothed Kaplan Meier hazard rates out of unemployment to employment and temp jobs 
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29 Table 2: Treatment effects 
 Men  Women 
  In-treatment Post-treatment In-treatment Post-treatment 
  coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se 
Homogenous Treatment Effects  -0.015 (0.015) 0.178 (0.022) -0.007 (0.014)  0.065 (0.019)
Heterogeneous Treatment Effects   
Foreigner         
Treatment (ref: natives)  -0.025 (0.015) 0.165 (0.023) -0.014 (0.015)  0.057 (0.019)
Treatment* west 1st  0.047 (0.084) 0.037 (0.107) -0.002 (0.086)  0.192 (0.103)
Treatment* west 2nd  0.370 (0.130) 0.460 (0.207) 0.324 (0.164)  0.452 (0.226)
Treatment* non west 1st  0.131 (0.063) 0.225 (0.078) 0.229 (0.452)  0.346 (0.112)
Treatment* non west 2nd  0.379 (0.130) 0.450 (0.201) 0.433 (0.172) 0.440 (0.237)
Education (edu)         
Treatment (ref: low edu)  0.087 (0.021) 0.203 (0.029) 0.026 (0.022)  0.062 (0.027)
Treatment*vocational edu  -0.225 (0.027) -0.050 (0.040) -0.054 (0.027) 0.003 (0.032)
Treatment*short academic edu  -0.012 (0.056) -0.002 (0.082) 0.074 (0.044) 0.097 (0.055)
Treatment*medium academic edu  0.003 (0.073) -0.006 (0.097) -0.190 (0.048) -0.020 (0.063)
Treatment*long academic edu  0.012 (0.128) 0.019 (0.171) 0.009 (0.075)  0.094 (0.097)
Notes: Bold coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. The distribution of the unob-
servables is approximated non-parametrically by a bivariate discrete distribution with six mass points. In addi-
tion, the model includes indicators for the year and quarter of entry into unemployment, for the number of 
temporary agency jobs (1, 2, 3-4, more than five), the number of regular jobs (1, 2, 3-4, more than five) during 
the past three years, indicators on how often the worker participated in programs of active labor market pro-
grams during the past three years (1, 2-3, more than 4), the yearly regional unemployment rate (based on 14 
regions), dummy variable indicating whether the workers was previously out of the labor force, or sick, and 





Table 3: The effect of labor market tightness and repeated treatments 
  Men Women 
 In-treatment  Post-treatment  In-treatment Post-treatment 
  coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se 
Unemployment rate            
Treatment (ref: mean u-rate)  0.002  0.015  0.185  0.022 0.002 0.015 0.195  0.023 
Treatment* (urate - mean urate)  -0.073  0.010  -0.032  0.014  -0.069  0.010  -0.030  0.014 
          
Accumulated duration of a gency 
jobs in weeks          
Treatment   0.010  0.015  0.168  0.028  0.030  0.014  0.138  0.023 
Treatment* (weeks in agency jobs)  -0.009  0.002  0.007  0.002  -0.013  0.002  0.004  0.002 
          
Number of treatments          
Treatment (ref. one treatment)  0.142  0.050  0.098  0.042 0.024 0.046 0.171  0.039 
Treatment*(two  treatments)  -0.087 0.087 0.091 0.068 -0.055 0.070 0.124  0.056 
Treatment*(three treatments)  -0.180  0.100  0.118  0.090  -0.055  0.070 -0.042 0.058 
Notes: Bold coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. In addition the model includes 
the same indicators as described in Table 2. 
 
  
30 Table 4: Temporary agency employment and post-unemployment wages  
(immediately after unemployment) 
  Men Women Men Women 
 coeff.  se  coeff.  se  coeff. se coeff. se 
Better wages:             
In-treatment effect  0.443  (0.022)  0.425  (0.021)      
Post-treatment effect  0.059  (0.033) -0.008 (0.029)         
Lower wages:          
In-treatment effect  -0.316  (0.025)  -0.200  (0.023)      
Post-treatment effect  0.461  (0.039)  0.371  (0.031)      
          
Wage increase          
In-treatment  effect       0.060  (0.010)  0.039  (0.009) 
Post-treatment  effect       0.010  (0.015)  -0.012  (0.012) 
          
Mean  log-likelihood  -2.912  -2.793  -3.137  -3.007  
N  146,987  176,316  146,987  176,316  
Notes: Bold coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5 









Table 5: Temporary agency employment and job and employment stability 
  Employment stability  Job stability 
  Men Women Men Women 
  coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se 
In-treatment -0.002  (0.028)  -0.052  (0.025) -0.029 (0.027) -0.048  (0.024) 
Post-treatment  0.021 (0.042) 0.062 (0.035) -0.013 (0.040) 0.028 (0.033) 
          
Mean  log-likelihood  -3.869  -3.779  -3.808  -3.737  
N  146,987  176,316  146,987  176,316  






31 Appendix - not for publication 
Table A1: Selected Sample Statistics  
  Men Women 
  Temp Non  temp Temp Non  temp 
  mean sd mean    mean sd mean sd 
Socio-economic characteristics      
Single  0.760 0.427 0.729 0.445 0.618 0.486 0.561 0.496
Working  partner  0.301 0.459 0.300 0.458 0.525 0.499 0.542 0.498
Child  in  household  0.205 0.403 0.232 0.422 0.379 0.485 0.438 0.496
Child  <  7  in  hh  0.131 0.337 0.147 0.354 0.223 0.416 0.277 0.447
Age      
Average  33.4 10.6 34.4 11 36.3 10.6 37.3 11.2
Less  than  20  0.032 0.175 0.031 0.172 0.013 0.113 0.018 0.132
20-24  0.222 0.416 0.183 0.387 0.129 0.336 0.109 0.312
25-34  0.346 0.476 0.359 0.480 0.353 0.478 0.341 0.474
35-44  0.213 0.409 0.221 0.415 0.251 0.434 0.247 0.431
Above  44  0.188 0.390 0.206 0.405 0.253 0.435 0.284 0.451
Nationality      
Danish  0.902 0.298 0.887 0.316 0.948 0.223 0.928 0.259
1st  gen.  west  0.028 0.165 0.025 0.157 0.024 0.152 0.021 0.143
2nd  gen.  west  0.004 0.065 0.004 0.064 0.003 0.058 0.004 0.060
1st gen. non west  0.058  0.233 0.075 0.263 0.020 0.141  0.041  0.199
2nd gen non west  0.008  0.089 0.009 0.094 0.005 0.070  0.006  0.079
Education      
Low  0.497 0.500 0.527 0.499 0.374 0.484 0.455 0.498
Vocational  training  0.404 0.491 0.382 0.486 0.434 0.496 0.377 0.485
Short  academic  0.055 0.227 0.040 0.195 0.089 0.284 0.059 0.236
Bachelor  0.031 0.173 0.034 0.181 0.075 0.264 0.084 0.277
Master  0.013 0.114 0.018 0.133 0.029 0.167 0.025 0.157
Copenhagen  0.291 0.454 0.264 0.441 0.363 0.481 0.279 0.448
Prev. LF status      
Employed  0.363 0.481 0.494 0.500 0.374 0.484 0.530 0.499
Temp  employed  0.266 0.442 0.027 0.161 0.249 0.432 0.020 0.139
Self-employed  0.004 0.063 0.010 0.099 0.001 0.034 0.006 0.077
Sick  0.072 0.259 0.066 0.248 0.082 0.275 0.071 0.257
Out  of  labor  force  0.295 0.456 0.404 0.491 0.294 0.455 0.373 0.484
Employment history      
Empl.  dur  (weeks)  75 52 74 52 79 52 70 50
Avg. no. temp jobs  0.755  1.290 0.405 0.948 0.818 1.610  0.485  1.420
Avg.  no.  almp  0.585 1.200 0.596 1.190 0.538 1.100 0.632 1.190
Avg. no. reg. jobs  2.870  2.380 3.300 3.220 2.610 2.430  3.930  4.710
          
Med. dur. unemp. spell  33 10 32   9 
Med. dur. temp spell  6 5    
          
Exit to regular job  0.767 0.612 0.788   0.660 
Employment stability  36 25 52   14 
Job stability  22 11 32   7 
Pre-wage  129 132 122 123 122 135 121 147
Post-wage  132 157 126 99 125 172 120 116
          
No. of persons  3,824 31,810 5,557   34,441 
No. of u-spells  11,224 112,205 14,249   122,994 
Notes: Pre-wages refer to the average hourly wage in DKK of the job before entering unemployment; post-
wages refer the first job after leaving successful unemployment. Employment stability measures the median 
total number of weeks employed and job stability measures the median number of weeks employed in the first 
job after leaving successful unemployment. 
  
32 Table A2: Sample selection 
  Men Women 
  Non  Temp Temp Non  Temp Temp 
    in %  in %  in %    in % 
Full  Sample  128,547  100.0 14,079 100.0  163,569 100.0 19,529 100.0 
- CEO / top manager  11,350  8.8  1,034  7.3  18,641  11.4  1,533  7.8 
- health sector  1,342  1.0  162  1.2  17,989  11.0  1,936  9.9 
-  parallel  students  3,650 2.8  942  6.7 3,945 2.4  883  4.5 
- spell over 52 weeks  0  0.0  658  4.7  0  0.0  855  4.4 
public  sector  temp  0 0.0  59  0.4 0 0.0  73 0.4 




33 Table A3: Full estimation results – homogenous treatment effects 
   Men Women 
    sel. equation  hazard to empl.  sel. equation  hazard to empl. 
    coeff. se coeff. es coeff. se coeff se 
Baseline hazard   0-4  -5.449 (0.173) -1.791 (0.082) -5.032  (0.163)  -1.708 (0.054)
(weeks)  4-8  -5.212 (0.175) -1.706 (0.082) -4.908  (0.164)  -1.922 (0.054)
 8-12  -5.157 (0.176) -1.816 (0.083) -4.847  (0.164)  -2.126 (0.055)
 12-16  -5.082 (0.177) -1.802 (0.083) -4.852  (0.165)  -2.081 (0.055)
 16-20  -5.199 (0.178) -1.921 (0.084) -4.971  (0.167)  -2.265 (0.056)
 20-25  -5.317 (0.179) -2.015 (0.084) -4.971  (0.166)  -2.341 (0.056)
 25-35  -5.257 (0.179) -2.031 (0.084) -4.985  (0.167)  -2.198 (0.055)
 35-52  -5.428 (0.179) -2.172 (0.084) -5.102  (0.167)  -2.373 (0.055)
 52-78  -5.676 (0.181) -2.271 (0.084) -5.310  (0.168)  -2.437 (0.056)
 78-104  -5.771 (0.186) -2.390 (0.086) -5.554  (0.174)  -2.537 (0.058)
 104-156  -6.139 (0.192) -2.549 (0.087) -5.766  (0.177)  -2.663 (0.059)
 -156  -6.254 (0.198) -2.662 (0.089) -5.993  (0.185)  -2.788 (0.061)
Age (ref: 25-34)  less than 20  0.477 (0.063) 0.207 (0.030) 0.165  (0.083)  0.169 (0.038)
 20-24  0.425 (0.030) 0.252 (0.012) 0.265  (0.033)  0.200 (0.014)
 35-44  -0.004 (0.029) -0.084 (0.011) -0.021 (0.026)  -0.064 (0.011)
 above  44  -0.108 (0.033) -0.255 (0.013) -0.141  (0.028)  -0.165 (0.012)
Family status
*  Single 0.022 (0.030) -0.062 (0.011) 0.038 (0.023)  -0.033 (0.010)
  Working partner  0.201 (0.026) 0.145 (0.010) 0.082  (0.021)  0.094 (0.008)
  Child in hh  -0.038 (0.043) 0.135 (0.015) -0.107  (0.029)  0.045 (0.011)
  Child < 7 in hh  -0.050 (0.048) -0.119 (0.016) -0.253  (0.032)  -0.105 (0.012)
Nationality   1st gen. west  0.026 (0.065) -0.089 (0.029) -0.070 (0.063)  -0.117 (0.032)
(ref: natives)  2nd gen. west  0.060 (0.172) -0.076 (0.071) -0.109 (0.164)  0.077 (0.081)
  1st gen. non west  -0.381 (0.048) -0.248 (0.021) -0.661  (0.065)  -0.287 (0.026)
  2nd gen non west  -0.317 (0.119) -0.082 (0.056) -0.574  (0.138)  -0.258 (0.070)
Education   Voc. training  0.191 (0.026) 0.152 (0.011) 0.191  (0.023)  0.093 (0.010)
(ref: low)  Short academic  0.399 (0.053) 0.159 (0.023) 0.309  (0.039)  0.127 (0.020)
 Bachelor  0.140 (0.065) 0.250 (0.027) 0.016 (0.042)  0.246 (0.018)
 Master  -0.175 (0.108) 0.119 (0.041) -0.130 (0.072)  0.226 (0.035)
Empl. dur. (weeks)    0.218 (0.043) 0.142 (0.016) 0.367  (0.039)  -0.188 (0.014)
Capital    0.062 (0.028) -0.059 (0.012) 0.132  (0.023) 0.008 (0.011)
Treatment effect  In-treatment  -0.015 (0.015)    -0.007 (0.014)
 Post-treatment  0.178 (0.022)     0.065 (0.019)
       
Mean log-
likelihood    -2.706    -2.622
N    146,987    176,316
Notes: Bold coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. In addition, the model includes indica-
tors for the year and quarter of entry into unemployment, for the number of temporary agency jobs (1, 2, 3-4, more than 
five), the number of regular jobs (1, 2, 3-4, more than five) during the past three years, indicators on how often the worker 
participated in programs of active labor market programs during the past three years (1, 2-3, more than 4), the yearly 
regional unemployment rate (based on 14 regions), a dummy variable indicating whether the workers was previously out 
of the labor force, or sick, and parameters for the distribution of the unobserved characteristics. 




Table A4: Homogenous treatment effects – baseline estimations 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
  coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se 
Men               
In-treatment  0.859  0.013  0.059 0.014  0.070  0.014 -0.009 0.014 
Post-treatment  0.275  0.019  0.260 0.022  0.261 0.022  0.175  0.022 
               
Unobserved  heterogeneity  no  no  yes  yes  
Control  variables  no  yes  yes  yes  
Mass  points  -  -  2  5  
Log-Likelihood  -2.416  -2.259  -2.712  -2.707  
N  146,987  146,987  146,987  146,987  
               
Women               
In-treatment  0.857  0.012  0.078 0.013  0.094 0.015 -0.006 0.014 
Post-treatment  0.227  0.016  0.164 0.020  0.135 0.019  0.068  0.019 
          
Unobserved  heterogeneity  no  no  yes  yes  
Control  variables  no  yes  yes  yes  
Mass-points  -  -  2  5  
Mean  log-likelihood  -2.334  -2.173  -2.628  -2.622  
N  176,316  176,316  176,316  176,316  






Table A5: Heterogeneous treatment effects – robustness check 
 Men  Women 
  In-treatment  Post-treatment In-treatment  Post-treatment
  coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se coeff. se 
Family Status   
Treatment (ref: married *no child)  0.007 0.031 0.163 0.043 -0.122 0.025 0.006 0.030
Treatment*married*child   -0.034 0.054 -0.073 0.082 0.157 0.042  0.127 0.051
Treatment*single*no child   -0.029 0.034 0.038 0.047 0.152 0.029  0.086 0.034
Treatment*single*child   0.071 0.055 0.071 0.083 0.171 0.048 0.059 0.062
Age   
Treatment (ref: 25 <= age < 35)  0.016 (0.022) 0.215 (0.033) 0.070 (0.021)  0.209 (0.030)
Treatment* age < 20  0.030 (0.114) 0.018 (0.167) 0.162 (0.128)  -0.382 (0.247)
Treatment* 20 <= age < 24   -0.060 (0.035) 0.101 (0.054) -0.039 (0.051) 0.058 (0.057)
Treatment* 35 <= age <44  0.005 (0.033) -0.092 (0.050) -0.051 (0.031)  -0.102 (0.040)
Treatment* age>=45  -0.055 (0.037) -0.171 (0.050) -0.227 (0.032)  -0.307 (0.038)
Working Partner         
Treatment (ref: no)  0.003 (0.017) 0.187 (0.026) 0.020 (0.019)  0.076 (0.025)
Treatment* yes  -0.052 (0.027) -0.044 (0.040) -0.054 (0.024) -0.019 (0.029)
Employment Experience (weeks)         
Treatment (ref: no employment)  -0.048 (0.024) 0.201 (0.035) -0.036 (0.023) 0.075 (0.030)
Treatment* 0 < empex <= 52 r  0.299 (0.046) 0.014 (0.059) 0.247 (0.042) 0.071 (0.048)
Treatment* 52 < empdex <= 104  0.062 (0.033) -0.036 (0.045) -0.022 (0.032)  -0.105 (0.038)
Treatment* 104 < empex  -0.024 (0.033) -0.066 (0.055) 0.061 (0.031)  0.144 (0.045)
Notes: Bold coefficients are statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level. In addition, the model includes 
indicators for the year and quarter of entry into unemployment, for the number of temporary agency jobs (1, 2, 3-
4, more than five), the number of regular jobs (1, 2, 3-4, more than five) during the past three years, indicators on 
how often the worker participated in programs of active labor market programs during the past three years (1, 2-
3, more than 4), the yearly regional unemployment rate (based on 14 regions), a dummy variable indicating 
whether the workers was previously out of the labor force, or sick, and parameters for the distribution of the 
unobserved characteristics. 
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